REMEDIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
FOLLOWING A RETALIATORY DISCHARGE*

The prevailing judicial perspective holds that undocumented
workers are "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act
and are protected against retaliatory constructive discharges by
employers. However, ambiguity surrounds the remedies available
to undocumented workers who have been subject to such discharges. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that
the affected undocumented workers could not receive backpay and
reinstatement remedies until they were legally present in the
United States. Nonetheless, subsequent judicial and administrative decisions have limited the Sure-Tan holding. This Comment
proposes a model for providing remedies to undocumented workers in light of the interactionbetween Sure-Tan, the post-Sure-Tan
cases, and the recent passageof the ImmigrationReform and Control Act of 1986.
INTRODUCTION: UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN THE UNITED
STATES LABOR MARKET

Undocumented immigration continues to be a national concern,
particularly as it affects the United States labor market.' Since
World War II, undocumented labor, predominantly from Mexico,
has been noted for its concentration in agriculture as temporary migrant labor. It gradually has shifted to urban locations as a more
* The student writer would like to acknowledge the helpful and appreciated
comments of Mark Berger, Sana Loue, William Odencrantz, Kristine Poplawski, Linda
Scher, Charles Wiggins and Scott Wilson.
1. Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986, H.R. REP.
No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1986) (to accompany H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986)); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., 2D
SESS., SERIAL 7, IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND BACKGROUND ON LEGALIZATION (Congressional Research Service 1985) [hereinafter Congressional Research Service]; General Accounting Office Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Illegal
Aliens: Limited Research Suggests Illegal Aliens May Displace Native Workers, GAO/
PEMD-86-9BR (1986).

permanent work force in service, construction, and manufacturing. 2
A lively debate has emerged as to whether these workers replace
United States workers in unwanted jobs, protect complementary jobs
in the primary labor market, and create other jobs for United States
workers by their expenditures in the local economy, or whether these
workers adversely affect domestic workers by depressing wages and
taking wanted jobs.3
A central concern in the labor market debate is the extent to
which employers exploit this presumably docile work force and how
such exploitation can, in turn, affect domestic workers.4 Employers
can segment the available labor market by preferring undocumented
workers over citizen and legal-resident workers in their hiring and
firing decisions. The adverse impact on domestic workers may be
viewed in both economic and violation-of-rights terms.
From an economic perspective, employers may justify their preference for undocumented workers on the grounds that they work
"harder" and "cheaper" than domestic workers. 5 Domestic workers
who compete for the same types of jobs as undocumented workers
would benefit by the removal of undocumented workers from the domestic labor market. Removal would restrict the employer's labor
supply and create an upward pressure on wages and working
conditions. 6
The benefit to domestic workers is the exact opposite from a violation-of-rights perspective. Domestic workers can benefit by having
undocumented workers protected in the same way they are. Employers often retaliate against undocumented workers who choose to exercise their labor rights, by reporting them to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).7 Yet, employers would have no advantage in reporting undocumented workers if they were penalized
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and by the courts
2.

H. CROSS & J. SANDOS, ACROSS THE BORDER: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEX-

ICO AND RECENT MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 54-55 (1981).

3. Id. at 84-95; see also Congressional Research Service, supra note 1, at 8-22;

SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION

POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 506-16 (1981) (staff report supplement).
4. P. MARTIN, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE COLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET (Center for Immigration Studies Paper 1 1986); J. NALVEN & C.
FREDERICKSON, THE EMPLOYER'S VIEW: Is THERE A Need FOR A GUEST-WORKER PROGRAM? (Community Research Assocs. 1982). Contra Cornelius & Fernandez-Kelly, Im-

pacts of Mexican Immigration upon Labor Markets and Industrial Organization in California: An Exploratory Study (unpublished essay for the Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies 1984).
5. Congressional Research Service, supra note 1, at 15-22.
6. However, in cases in which the affected jobs respond to a global production
line, the removal of undocumented workers may result in the jobs being exported, and
may result in a pyrrhic victory for those seeking to protect the domestic labor market.
7. Bracamonte, The NationalLabor Relations Act and Undocumented Workers:
The De-Alienation of American Labor, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 45-48 (1983).
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for unfair labor practices against undocumented workers. 8 Thus, undocumented workers would not be dissuaded from participating in a

unionization effort out of a fear of being reported by employers and
deported by the INS. The added participation of undocumented
workers would bolster unionization efforts.
These two perspectives on how best to protect domestic labor from
undocumented workers are addressed separately under the Immigra-

tion and Nationality Act (INA)9 and the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). 10 Under the INA, alien workers are excluded from
the United States unless there are insufficient numbers of domestic
workers who are willing, able, qualified, and available to work in
jobs advertised by employers, and unless these aliens "will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the

United States similarly employed."" These provisions incorporate
the economic perspective of domestic labor by seeking to control the

labor supply. However, prior to the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),' 2 the immigration laws did
not directly speak to the employment of aliens who completely
flouted the process of lawful admission. Under the INA, as it was
passed in 1952 and existed through 1986, it was a felony to willfully
import, transport, or harbor an undocumented alien, but not to employ undocumented aliens.' 3 Thus, the economic perspective of pro-

tecting domestic workers was not fully incorporated in pre-IRCA
immigration law.
Although employers encountered no sanctions by hiring undocu8. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) [hereinafter NLRA], forbid employer retaliation for concerted
activity of domestic labor. NLRA § 8(a)(1),(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982) [hereinafter
INA].
10. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
11. INA § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INA excludes the following
classes of aliens from admission into the United States:
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified
to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . .and available . . .to
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens
will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the
United States similarly employed.
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987) [hereinafter IRCA].
13. INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). Southwest agribusiness effectively lobbied
Congress to exempt employers from sanctions, popularly referred to as the "Texas
Proviso."

mented workers, they were effectively estopped under the NLRA

from firing these same workers when the workers took advantage of

the rights enjoyed by citizen and legal resident workers. 14 Thus, it

has been argued that there was no "antinomy" between the INA
and the NLRA; in fact, the two acts have been viewed as complementary. 15 Prior to 1986 the INA sought to exclude unneeded and

unauthorized entrants to the labor market, while the NLRA sought
to protect such workers -

as all workers -

once they became pre-

sent in the labor market.
With the passage of IRCA in 1986, the employment of new un-

documented workers is unlawful. From an economic perspective, the
INA can now be viewed as far more aggressive in protecting domestic workers by reducing the presence of undocumented workers in
the labor market. However, two implications may be drawn from the
residual role of the NLRA. First, even though it still may be maintained that the NLRA complements the INA by the classification of

undocumented workers who remain in the United States as "employees," the need for such protections should diminish with a corresponding reduction in the presence of undocumented workers in the
labor market. Second, the reinstatement and backpay remedies
under the NLRA are arguably truncated: reinstatement should be
difficult to obtain because it is now illegal for the employers to employ undocumented workers. However, certain provisions in IRCA
may permit reinstatement for undocumented workers who remain in
the United States in "limbo" - those not eligible for legalization
nor subject to the reporting requirements demanded of all new hires.

14. Since 1944 courts have consistently included undocumented workers within
the essential term "employee" under the NLRA. In Logan & Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310,
315 n.12 (1944), the NLRB rejected any distinction between citizen and noncitizen:
"The Act does not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. In order to effectively
carry out the purposes of the Act, we conclude that no distinction should be drawn on
such a basis." See also Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977) (the NLRB regional
director held that the undocumented workers employed by the company were entitled to
vote in a union election); Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976) (the
NLRB held that the employer's firing of undocumented workers prior to a union election
was an unfair labor practice); Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973) (the
Administrative Law Judge was overruled by the NLRB on the exclusion of an undocumented worker from a union election); Azusa Citrus Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1946)
(the union's objection to the participation of a Mexican national in an election was overruled by the NLRB). Two key court of appeals decisions in the late 1970's have reinforced the NLRB position that undocumented workers are "employees" under the terms
of the Act: NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978), and NLRB v. Apollo
Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979). The language of the NLRA by which these
decisions construe "employee" is found in 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
15. See Bracamonte supra note 7, at 29, 50.
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IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL

ACT OF 1986

A significant element in IRCA is the inclusion of a one-time amnesty for undocumented persons who entered the United States
before January 1, 1982.18 IRCA does not provide for any mass deportation programs to eliminate the presence of undocumented workers in the United States - a scheme which could well engender
xenophobic reactions to "foreign"-looking persons. 17 Instead, Congress opted to act through the labor market. While this conversion to
legal status will reduce the number of undocumented persons in the
United States, it will not eliminate them. IRCA further proposes to
use prospective employer sanctions as a vehicle to demagnetize the
domestic labor market for future entrants. However, the workers
who came to the United States after January 1, 1982, and prior to
the passage of IRCA, will be in a state of limbo: they will not be
able to take advantage of the legalization program, and they probably will not be expelled because, if already working, they would not
be subject to the prospective reporting system.
IRCA does not explicitly state what remedies should be available
to these "grandfathered" undocumented workers if they are subjected to unfair' labor practices. However, IRCA should be judged
against its recognition of a period of transition and the balancing of
competing rights and interests of employers and employees. The
clearest statement on remedies is provided in the immediate predecessor to IRCA - House of Representatives bill 3810.18 The bill
provides relevant legislative history on what the Committee on the
Judiciary would have intended employer sanctions to achieve during
this transition period. Broadly stated, the Committee's intent was to
leave intact existing "protections" for undocumented workers. 19
16. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245A(a)(2)).
17. The primary mechanisms of IRCA are defensive in nature, such as tightening
up screening procedures to federal grant programs, requiring employers to check documents of new hires, and increasing deployment of Border Patrol agents for preventing
entries without inspection. Moreover, the bill is sensitive to potential unfair immigrationrelated employment practices. It calls for the termination of employer sanctions if widespread discrimination against citizens, nationals, or eligible workers is discovered by the
Comptroller General. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3360 (amending/adding INA § 274A).
Other observers who are solely result-oriented will argue that it is unimportant whether
increased deportations are achieved by defensive or offensive enforcement mechanisms.
18. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
19. Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986, H.R. REP.
No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 58:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions
of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in
existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards,

Apparently, the Committee on the Judiciary expected the holding
in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB20 to survive impending legislative reforms. Given the debate that has since developed over the breadth of
the Sure-Tan holding, it is unclear, in retrospect, how the Committee construed Sure-Tan. Specifically, what remedies did the Committee have in mind for undocumented workers who are entitled to
be considered "employees" under the NLRA? A close review of
Sure-Tan and the subsequent limiting opinions in the Ninth Circuit,
the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board will provide a framework for understanding
H.R. 3810, as well as clarify the interaction between this line of
cases and IRCA.
SURE-TAN, INC. V.

NLRB

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB involved the employees of two leather
processing companies, most of whom were undocumented workers.
These workers helped elect as their bargaining agent the Chicago
Leather Workers Union, Local 431.21 The employer objected to the
election on the grounds that the majority of the workers was present
in the United States illegally. The NLRB Acting Regional Director
rejected the employer's claim that these workers were ineligible to
vote and certified the election. 22 The employer then wrote to the
INS, requesting a review of the alien status of certain employees.23
All five of the employees that the INS checked acknowledged their
unauthorized presence in the United States and accepted voluntary
departure to Mexico on February 18, 1977.24 The NLRB upheld the
finding of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of unfair labor practice, holding that the employer's notification of the INS constituted a
labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such
agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing law. In particular,
the employer sanctions provisions are not intened [sic] to limit in any way the
scope of the term "employee" in Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), as amended, or of the rights and protections stated in Sections 7
and 8 of that Act. As the Supreme Court observed in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
application of the NLRA 'helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment.'
These employment-related protections are not those which have been implemented in
IRCA. The unfair immigration-related employment practices enacted in IRCA speak to
discrimination against individuals based on national origin or those intending citizenship
- that is, the section protects civil, not labor rights. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. 3374
(amending/adding INA § 274B(a)(1)).
20. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
21. Id. at 886.
22. Id. at 887.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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retaliatory constructive discharge.2 5 The ALJ did not recommend a
backpay award, concluding that these deported workers were unavailable for work. However, the ALJ did recommend reinstatement.
26
The offer to these workers was to be kept open for six months.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Board's position, ordering, however, that the remedy be modified: the offer for reinstatement would
be held open for four years and a minimum six-month backpay
award would be made even though the discriminatees were unavailable for work; however, in order to claim their backpay award, the
discriminatees would have to legally re-enter the United States.
2
The NLRB adopted the order directed by the Seventh Circuit.
The Supreme Court upheld the liability finding, 7-2, but rejected
the proposed remedy, 5-4, to award six months' backpay. The Court
held that the six-month backpay award was based on "pure speculation and does not comport with the general reparative policies of the
NLRA. . .[and is] not sufficiently tailored to the actual, compen29
sable injuries suffered by the discharged employees." While the
Court held that the NLRA generally is not in conflict with the INA,
it also noted that the INA could not be completely ignored by the
deported employees'
NLRB and conditioned reinstatement on 3the
0
"legal readmittance to the United States."
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB captures the twists of logic replayed in
many and diverse forums concerning how best to resolve the undocumented worker issue: mass deportation schemes are not invoked; attempts are made to keep employers at arms length from undocumented workers; and the INS is expected to maintain the integrity
of the national border. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
explained the Sure-Tan Court's decision as a "counterintuitive" reconciliation of the INA and the NLRA.3 1 Justice Brennan, in his dis'32 Justice
sent, characterized the result as a "disturbing anomaly.
25. Id. at 888.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 890.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 901.

30. By conditioning the offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry, a
potential conflict with the INA is thus avoided. Similarly, in computing backpay, the
employees must be deemed "unavailable" for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore
tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States.

Id. at 903.
31.
32.

Id. at 892.
Id. at 911 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

Brennan lamented the Court's simultaneous recognition that these
workers are entitled to bring an unfair labor practice claim, while at
the same time are stripped of effective remedies. 33 Justice O'Connor
weighed the workings of immigration laws more heavily than these
individual remedies." The Court's majority is forging a practical,
institutionalized solution to making both immigration and labor laws
work in harmony.
In light of Sure-Tan, subsequent litigants and courts have come to
different interpretations as to the significance of "availability for
work." Did the Court mean that undocumented workers are by definition (because of their unlawful immigration status) legally unavailable for work and are therefore never eligible for backpay awards?
Or did the Court narrowly refer only to those undocumented workers who were deported as not entitled to backpay awards until they
can legally re-enter the United States, thus providing no incentive
for illegal re-entry? Under the latter reading, undocumented workers
who remain in the United States can be viewed as available for work
and hence eligible for backpay awards. The latter reading is justified
by the violation-of-rights perspective outlined earlier by removing
the employer's incentive to undermine the assertion of protected
NLRA employee rights. The cases discussed below will explore these
interpretations of Sure-Tan.
PosT-Sure-Tan DECISIONS

United States Ninth Circuit
Bevies Company, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 98635
Bevles, the employer, had received a letter from his attorney advising him that it was against California law to knowingly hire illegal aliens. Bevles proceeded to dismiss two of his employees after
they failed to satisfy his questions regarding their lawful immigration status.3 6 Teamsters Local 986 represented the dismissed employees and argued successfully before the arbitrator that Bevies lacked
just cause. The arbitrator held that because Bevies was unable to
show that he would have been subjected to criminal penalties in California for hiring undocumented workers, he violated the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement. Bevies was ordered to reinstate
both workers and give backpay to one of them.
The Ninth Circuit held that the arbitrator's award was correct.
The award did not violate public policy, since Congress had not
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 893-94.
791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 15, 1986).
Id. at 1392.
Id.
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made the employment of undocumented workers a crime for either
the undocumented worker or the employer."a Additionally, because
there were no active state proscriptions, the arbitrator's award was
not a manifest disregard of law.3 9 The Court also reasoned that
Sure-Tan did not announce any public policy sufficient to prohibit
the arbitrator's award. First, the review of an arbitrator's reading of
a collective bargaining agreement is more limited than a review of
an NLRB decision. Second, the petitioners in Sure-Tan had already
left the United States; thus the Supreme Court's holding was directed at discouraging illegal re-entry, thereby avoiding "a potential
conflict with the INA."4 However, the dissent in Bevies read the
majority's holding to be in direct conflict with the Supreme Court in
Sure-Tan."
The Felbrol2 Decision
The impact of Sure-Tan confronted the Ninth Circuit again in
NLRB v. Felbro, Inc.4 Felbro, a California manufacturer, dismissed
several workers and modified work practices during the election of
Local 512 as the workers' bargaining agent in mid-1981. The ALJ
determined that these dismissals were violations of sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.4 4 Five of the dismissed workers testified
under assumed names, indicating thereby that they were undocumented workers.4 5 During the period prior to the AL's hearing, the
five undocumented workers remained in the United States and were
in fact reinstated by Felbro.4 6 The ALJ recommended the traditional
remedies of backpay and reinstatement for those workers as well as
38. Id. at 1392-93. Further, California Labor Code section 2805, dealing with the
knowing employment of illegal aliens, was correctly ignored since its status remains unclear. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987).
39. Bevies, 791 F.2d at 1393.
40. Id.
41. Sure-Tan unmistakably requires that the sanctions imposed by reason of the
labor law be reconciled with the immigration laws. The arbitration award attempts no
such reconciliation. It could have done so by providing that reinstatement and back pay
were permissible only when [the] plaintiffs ... became "lawfully entitled to be present
and employed in the United States." The mere presence of [the plaintiffs] in the United
States does not provide the "reconciliation" of which Sure-Tan spoke. Id. at 1394
(Sneed, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
42. The court consolidated the case of Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers'
Union v. NLRB with NLRB v. Felbro, Inc.
43. 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 709.
45. Id. at 710.
46. Id. at 709.

retroactive enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. 47
The undocumented status of these workers did not factor into the
ALl's decision concerning Felbro's unfair labor practices or the remedies awarded to these workers.48
The NLRB, however, modified the ALJ decision. The NLRB took
note of Sure-Tan, which was decided subsequent to the ALJ's determination in Felbro, and conditioned the ALJ's remedy on the legal
presence of these workers in the United States. The NLRB interpreted Sure-Tan "to mean that an undocumented alien worker
would never be entitled to backpay, and required the compliance officer to determine
the legality of each discriminatee's presence in the
49
United States.
The Ninth Circuit approved the NLRB's findings on Felbro's unfair labor practices, but held that the NLRB's conditioning of the
backpay remedy was inconsistent with both the NLRA50 and the
INA; 51 it thus denied enforcement of this part of the NLRB order.
The Ninth Circuit found Felbro to be significantly distinguishable
from the facts in Sure-Tan,5 2 and referred to its own precedent,
NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co. 53 in affirming its recognition of "the right
of backpay of undocumented discriminatees who are available for
work in the United States. 54
The NLRB petitioned for rehearing en banc from the Ninth Circuit, pointing to the dissent in both Bevies and Felbro as the correct
reading of the Sure-Tan holding. Following Judge Beezer's dissent in
Felbro, the NLRB asserted that the Sure-Tan Court "did not limit
its holding to situations where the alien has been physically removed
from the United States through deportation or voluntary
departure. ' 55

47. Id. at 710.
48. Id. at 714.
49. Id. at 716 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 719.
51. Id.
52. Sure-Tan does not address the question whether an undocumented worker
who remains in the United States, and who has not been the subject of any INS deportation proceedings, is barred from receiving backpay to remedy an NLRA violation ....
[T]he thrust of [Sure-Tan] is directed at the speculative nature of the Board's remedy.
Unlike the five Sure-Tan employees, the Felbro discriminatees' lost wages can be determined precisely. . . .The backpay owing here is thus "actual," not "speculative." Thus,
Sure-Tan does not control the backpay award for the Felbro discriminatees. Id. at 717
(emphasis in original).
53. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. 795 F.2d at 724.
55. Petition for Rehearing on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board at 5,
(9th Cir. August 18, 1986), Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB,
795 F.2d 705, reh'g denied, CV 85-7355 (9th Cir. September 4, 1986), and, CV 85-7281
(9th Cir. October 3, 1986).
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Arizona State Court
56
Arizona Farmworkers' Union v. Phoenix Vegetable Distributors

The Arizona Farmworkers' Union (AFW) and six of its members

brought an action against Phoenix Vegetable Distributors, alleging
unfair labor practices in blacklisting these workers and in refusing to

rehire them because of their union activities.5 7 An injunction was

granted by the superior court, ordering reinstatement. The Arizona

Court of Appeals held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction prior to a hearing by the Arizona
Agricultural Employment Relations Board,"8 and that Sure-Tan did
not control the instant case. The court argued:
- The NLRA exempted agricultural workers from its purview, as a59result of
which Arizona passed state labor laws to protect its farmworkers.
* State 6°law must actually conflict with federal law, not potentially conflict
with it; since there are no employer sanctions at present, the6employer is
not violating the INA by rehiring the undocumented workers.
* The argument for implied preemption of state law can be justified if it is
for states to supplement fedreasonable 2to infer that Congress left no room
eral laws. However, in DeCanas v. Bica,63 the Supreme Court held that
California's employer sanctions law was not necessarily preempted by the
INA: Congress intended that the States be allowed, "to the extent consis6
tent with federal law, [to] regulate the employment of illegal aliens."
9 According to Sure-Tan, one purpose of the INA is to deter illegal immireinstatement order as an
gration, but the Court did not perceive a 6state
obstacle to "deterring illegal immigration." 5

The dissent in Arizona Farmworkers' argues that the Arizona
court "is not empowered to review the United States Supreme

Court's decision on the issue of what action conflicts with the policies
underlying the Immigration and Naturalization [sic] Act."' 6 Fur56. No. 1 CA-CIV 8199 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 10, 1986).
57. Id.at 1.
58. Id.

59. Id.at 7.
60. Id.at 9.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.at 7-8.
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
Arizona Farmworkers', No. I CA-CIV 8199, slip op. at 7 (quoting DeCanas,

424 U.S. at 36).
65. Arizona Farmworkers, No. 1 CA-CIV 8199, slip op. at 10-11 "Neither a
state court order of reinstatement nor a federal order of deportation undermines the authority of the other. Thus, an order of reinstatement would have no more than 'some
purely speculative and indirect impact upon immigration.'" The court further held that
"the [INA] does not preempt the authority of Arizona courts to order reinstatement of
illegal aliens not entitled to work in the United States." Id.
66. Id.at 15.

ther, the dissenting judge noted that whether principles of comity or
accomodation are invoked, the remedies extended to the undocumented workers were ruled invalid by the Supreme Court under the
INA: "If these remedies are contrary to the [INA] so as to preclude
utilization by another federal agency, the [NLRB], then a fortiori,
under the supremacy clause, the [INA] would preclude the use of
the same remedies by a state agency to enforce state law."'67
Job SY:(DARBY)490IP.JOB has completed composition.
CaliforniaAgricultural Labor Relations Board
Rigi Agricultural Services, Inc.6 8
Three undocumented employees at Rigi Agricultural Services, Inc.
(Rigi), a northern California vineyard, were fired on February 5,
1982,'and subsequently found by an Administrative Law Judge to
have been dismissed for their union activities."" The California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) ordered Rigi to reinstate
these workers, who had not been deported by the INS, and give
them backpay. 70 Rigi sought delay of the ALRB's order, pending the
outcome of Sure-Tan. The ALRB denied Rigi's request because it
did not find "Sure-Tan sufficiently related to the instant case to justify deviation from [its] usual practice of treating all agricultural
employees alike, regardless of their immigration status. ' 71 Once the
United States Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan v. NLRB on June
25, 1984, Rigi filed a motion with the ALRB to issue an interim
72
decision.
The ALRB noted that Sure-Tan could be distinguished from Rigi
because, unlike the employees in Rigi, the Sure-Tan employees were
deported to Mexico. 3 However, the Board preferred to follow a different line of analysis. The Board argued that the conditions imposed
on the Sure-Tan employees "[did] not constitute applicable NLRA
precedent under section 1148 of the [Agricultural Labor Relations
Act]" (ALRA).7 The ALRB decision offers a similar rationale to
67. Id. at 14. (Haire, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68. 11 A.L.R.B. No. 27 (1985).
69. Id. at 3. Rigi stated that he dismissed the workers because they "ran from an
agent of the United States Immigration & Naturalization Service ('INS') and [he]
learned that the employees were undocumented aliens without the right to work in the
United States." Appellant's Brief at 4, Rigi Agric. Servs., Inc. v. California Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., No. 85-2145 (9th Cir. October 30, 1985).
70. Rigi, II A.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 3.
71. Id. Rigi also petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of review
under section 1160.8 of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, but was denied. Rigi pursued the issue to the California Supreme Court and was denied a hearing.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
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that set forth in Arizona Farmworkers7 6 as to why a state entity is
not compelled to follow the NLRB precedent as set forth in SureTan.

The ALRB reasoned that the Sure-Tan Court premised its decision on federal agency comity by which federal agencies should accomodate their directives to any congressional laws which might present a potential conflict. From the ALRB perspective, federal agency
comity is irrelevant to state agencies enforcing state laws.71 Applicable California law, ALRA section 1160.3, makes no distinction regarding the lawful immigration status of employees receiving
backpay or reinstatement remedies."
The ALRB also argued that its decision was not preempted by the
INA's function of deterring illegal entry and presence in the United
States, thereby invalidating the decision by reason of the supremacy
clause. 18 The ALRB stated that preemption did not apply to its action in Rigi for three reasons. First, there is no express or implied
legislative intent to occupy the field. The ALRA represents California's historic exercise of its police powers and the protection of its
workers; the mere existence of the INA does not prevent the ALRB
from issuing remedial orders, inasmuch as Congress has not expressly or impliedly reserved the regulation of the employment of
undocumented workers through the INA. 9 Second, there is no actual conflict between state law - the ALRB remedial order - and
federal law - the Immigration and Nationality Act. State law is
preempted when it actually conflicts with federal law rather than
when it potentially conflicts with it.8 0 Finally, the ALRB ruling does
not stand as an obstacle to immigration law. The ALRB notes that a
major purpose of the INA is to prevent undocumented immigration.
The Board can find only a speculative and indirect relation between
its remedial orders and INS operations, which provides insufficient
grounds upon which to anchor preemption.8 1
The ALRB dissent takes issue with this argument offered by the
75. Arizona Farmworkers', No. I CA-CIV 8199, slip op. at 14.
76. Rigi, 11 A.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 7-8.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 15. This argument may be mooted by the passage of employer sanctions
penalties in IRCA.
80. The ALRB stated, "Under federal law, employers are not prohibited from
employing undocumented aliens, even those subject to a final order of deportation
(FOD). Thus, an agricultural employer can comply with an ALRB order of reinstatement and backpay without violating the INA." Id. at 16.
81. Id. at 20-21.

majority, perceiving the Board's remedial orders as "a strong incentive for illegal reentry or continued illegal presence. '8 2 The dissent
seeks a middle ground between the ALRB majority and the SureTan Court's order to the NLRB. The dissent would hold the discriminatee as presumptively entitled to the Board's remedy. However, should the respondent be able to rebut that presumption and

demonstrate that the discriminatee is subject to a final order of deportation, the discriminatee would be held to be ineligible for the
awarded remedy, unless the discriminatee attained legal status to
work in the United States prior to the compliance hearing. 3
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM

The enactment of employer sanctions would seemingly undermine
the reinstatement remedy. How can an undocumented worker receive reinstatement once the law prohibits employers from knowingly
hiring undocumented workers? Such sanctions would appear to
render moot dicta rationalizing the reinstatement remedy for undocumented workers.8 4 The federal courts would then be unable to
82. Id. at 24 (Member James-Massengale, dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 26. The ALRB subsequently issued a show cause order, indicating the
Board's intention to adopt the dissent's position. See Notice of Board's Intention to Revise Decision and Order to Show Cause, Rigi Agric. Servs., Inc., A.L.R.B. No. 27 (Sept.
4, 1986). The Board then rescinded its show cause order in light of the passage of IRCA.
See Order Rescinding Order to Show Cause, 11 A.L.R.B. No. 27 (Dec. 15, 1986).
84. Each of the cases discussed relies upon the premise, now invalidated by the
enactment of IRCA, that federal law does not make the hiring of undocumented workers
unlawful.
Sure-Tan: "Since the employment relationship between an employer and an undocumented alien is hence not illegal under the INA, there is no reason to conclude that
application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily
conflict with the terms of the INA." Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893.
Bevies: "We hold that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement and backpay notwithstanding the immigration status of the employees neither violates a clearly defined public
policy nor is in manifest disregard of the law." Bevies, 791 F.2d at 1392.
Felbro:There is no provision "in the INA making it unlawful for an employer to hire
an alien who is present or working in the United States without appropriate authorization." Felbro, 795 F.2d at 719.
Arizona Farmworkers':
[W]e must determine whether a court's order of reinstatement to illegal aliens
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of [the INA's goal of deterring
illegal immigration]. A state court order of reinstatement does not restrain or
limit the ability of the Immigration and Naturalization System to deport illegal
aliens. Although once reinstated an illegal alien worker may have a greater
incentive to remain in the United States, an appropriate federal order of deportation is fully enforceable. Neither a state court order of reinstatement nor a
federal order of deportation undermines the authority of the other. Thus, an
order of reinstatement would have no more than "some purely speculative and
indirect impact upon immigration." Such an impact is insufficient to invoke
preemption.
Arizona Farmworkers', No. I CA-CIV 8199, slip. op. at 14.
Rigi:
Regardless of whether the Sure-Tan decision is read broadly or narrowly, how-
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state that federal law does not make it unlawful for employers to
hire undocumented workers; state courts and boards could no longer
maintain that employers would be able to comply with their orders
without the employer also violating federal law.
The courts could, however, take note of the undocumented

worker's original date of employment for the employer represented
in the instant case. If the date is prior to November 6, 1986 (the

date IRCA becomes effective), the court could hold that the express
language of Congress to "grandfather" these undocumented workers

as current employees provides a basis for any action as an employee
under the NLRA. Reading the pertinent sections of IRCA together

suggests an express language basis for voiding the applicability of
employer sanctions to the employers of these workers, thereby re-

moving an obstacle to the imposition of a reinstatement remedy. 85

Even if reinstatement is eliminated as a remedy by the passage of

employer sanctions, the backpay remedy could still be applied under
the approach taken by post-Sure-Tan cases. Backpay could be justi-

fied because nothing in the committee report or in IRCA directly
speaks to the issue of remedies for retaliatory discharges. Undocu-

mented workers would be able to receive backpay for the period they
were discriminatorily discharged. However, this issue still turns on
the Supreme Court's "availability for work" language is
how broadly
8
construed. 6

ever, it is apparent to us that the conditions placed on reinstatement and
backpay do not constitute applicable NLRA precedent under section 1148 of
the [Agricultural Labor Relations] Act. The Sure-Tan Court's accomodation
analysis was grounded in the case of Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB the seminal
case on federal agency comity....
The issue before us, however, is quite different. Any obligation on the part of
the ALRB, a state agency enforcing a state statute, to restrict its remedies in
order to accomodate the congressional objectives embodied in the INA or any
other federal law raises principles of federalism which must be analyzed under
an entirely separate set of precedent. As the Sure-Tan court noted, in another
context, "federalism concerns are simply not at stake [in the Sure-Tan case]."
Rigi, 11 A.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 7-8 (citations and footnote omitted).
85. IRCA § 101(a)(3)(B), 100 Stat. 3372 (describing inapplicability of INA §
274A(a)(2)). Specifically, that "Section 274A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act shall not apply to the continuing employment of an alien who was hired before the
date of the enactment of this Act." This section would void the application of (a)(2),
employer sanctions: "(2) Continuing employment. - It is unlawful for a person or other
entity, after hiring an alien for employment in accordance with paragraph (1), to continue to employ the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an
unauthorized alien with respect to such employment."
86. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904.

FARMWORKERS: VARIATION ON A THEME

IRCA is sensitive to farmer demands for an adequate supply of
workers as well as abuses that have developed in reliance on an undocumented labor force in agriculture. The legalization of undocumented workers in agriculture is far broader than that offered for
nonagricultural workers. Up to 350,000 undocumented farmworkers
could obtain a one-year temporary legal status. 87 These workers
would be able to convert their status to permanent resident status if
they worked in agriculture for ninety days between April 30, 1985
and May 1, 1986; if they worked for ninety days in the preceding
two years; and if they resided in the United States for an aggregate
of six months during each of these years. 88 Should this group of
workers turn out to be insufficient to meet agricultural demand, allowances are made for replenishment workers.8 9
Presumably, workers who are provided temporary legal status for
work in agriculture would have the same employee protections as
domestic workers because those protections would be part of the legalization effort. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying
IRCA states that these workers should "be considered as United
States workers." 90
The number of undocumented workers who will remain in limbo
should be proportionately smaller for those in farming than those in
urban occupations. For undocumented workers in urban occupations,
there is a four-and-one-half-year gap between legalization and enactment of the bill. For undocumented workers in farming, the failure
to achieve legalization, by proving continuous presence prior to January 1, 1982, is supplemented by having worked in agriculture during
1985-86. Still, even the lax ninety-day employment in farming and
six-month aggregate residency requirements may prove too narrow
for many migrant farmers. It is unclear whether undocumented
workers who fall outside this broad period for legalization would
have remedies available to them. Because the NLRA does not cover
agricultural workers, state statutes, such as the Agricultural Labor
Relations Act in California and the Agricultural Employment Relations Act in Arizona, would be applicable.
Finally, IRCA may render moot older cases such as Rigi and Arizona Farmworkers'. The contested issue of whether such workers
87. IRCA § 302(a), 100 Stat. 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 303(a).
90. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. 3422-26 (amending/adding INA § 210A). H.R. CONF.
REi. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 97 ("Conferees intend that individuals admitted
under Section 302 [permanent residence for certain special agricultural workers] and 303
[admission of additional special agricultural workers] . . .as temporary or permanent
resident aliens be considered as United States workers . ..."
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would be eligible for remedies, especially reinstatement, may no

longer be applicable since the workers involved could well have temporary legal status as farmworkers. No final order of deportation
would issue at this point. The retaliatory discharge in Rigi occurred
on February 5, 1982, 91 and blacklisting and refusal to rehire in Arizona Farmworkers' occurred prior to December 26, 1984.92
RECOMMENDED REMEDIES

Three classifications of undocumented workers emerge out of
IRCA. The courts will need to adopt different standards of review
for each of these classes or categories to effectively implement
IRCA, and at the same time, maintain the integrity of the NLRA's
protections for all employees against retaliatory discharges. While
the qualifying criteria differ for agricultural and nonagricultural
workers, both groups contain the following three classes: 1) post-enactment workers - undocumented workers who arrive after the enactment of IRCA; 2) qualifying workers - undocumented workers
who arrived within the qualifying period;93 and 3) limbo (or
grandfathered) workers - undocumented workers who arrived
before . 4the enactment of IRCA, but not within the qualifying
period
An equitable application of remedies to these three classes of undocumented workers must be accomplished in a way that gives substantial consideration to protecting domestic workers from both an
economic and violation-of-rights perspective. IRCA's solution to protecting the domestic worker through immigration reform achieves
this objective by paying equal attention to undocumented workers
and their employers: for the undocumented worker, IRCA increases
physical deterrence at the border;9 5 for the employer, IRCA imposes
sanctions at the marketplace. 96 From an economic perspective, both
actions protect the labor market for domestic workers. However, employers still must be deterred from intruding upon the labor rights
available to all "employees" under the NLRA, by the ability to re91. Appellant's Brief at 4, Rigi Agric. Servs., Inc. v. California Agric. Labor Relations Bd., No. 85-2145 (9th Cir. October 30, 1985).
92. Arizona Farmworkers, No. 1 CA-CIV 8199, slip op. at 1.
93. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245A); id. §
302(a), 100 Stat. 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)).
94. Id. § 101(a)(3)(B), 100 Stat. 3372 (describing the nonapplicability of INA §
274A(a)(2)).
95. Id. § 111(a), 100 Stat. 3381.
96. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3360-68 (amending/adding INA § 274A).

taliate against undocumented "employees" who attempt to exercise
their rights.
The three classes of workers created by IRCA calls for a tailoring
of remedies and accompanying standards of review to achieve the
appropriate effect of protecting domestic workers.
Post-enactment Workers
The full force of IRCA is directed at future undocumented entrants into the United States labor market. These workers should not
have a reinstatement remedy since IRCA intends to preclude these
workers from being hired by making their employment unlawful.9 7
However, if employers do hire post-enactment workers, they should
not be permitted to use the threat of a report to the INS to chill
associational activity. For example, the Sure-Tan decision effectively
gives such employers one free bite at the apple, permitting them to
report these workers to the INS without being sanctioned on this
occasion.98 The cease-and-desist order addresses only repeated reports to the INS to thwart employees from availing themselves of
their rights under the NLRA.'9
IRCA calls for equal attention to both the employer and the undocumented worker; neither escapes its purview. Thus, the denial of
the reinstatement remedy to the post-enactment worker should be
juxtaposed with the imposition of backpay upon the employer for
attempting to undermine the NLRA employee status. The payment
of backpay by the employer can be construed in the same way as an
extension of the employer sanctions penalty. Both serve the purpose
of maintaining the integrity of the domestic labor market and the
effective functioning of the NLRA. 100 Should the court balk at
awarding the post-enactment worker backpay, the penalty can be deposited with the United States Treasury to be assigned for any number of purposes, such as defraying the costs of legalization. Further,
the Government of Mexico has questioned the fairness of the United
States in the treatment of its nationals. 10 Mexico's challenge affects
each branch of the United States government. The award of backpay
97. Id.
98. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 895-96, 904.
99. Id.
100. The NLRB would be unlikely to choose this course of action on its own since
the Board "lacks authority to punish; its remedy must not be punitive in nature." 2 C.
MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1634 (C. Morris ed. 1983). The court may also
adhere to the NLRA remedial objectives in this situation, refusing to impose a penalty
on the employer. However, if the court approaches this situation from the perspective of
IRCA and employer sanctions, it might be willing to adopt the proposed penalty. Alternatively, Congress may decide to enact this penalty as a necessary complement to employer sanctions.
101. Discursos del Presidentede Mexico durante su visita a los Estados Unidos
de America, 34 EL MERCADO DE VALOREs 806 (1986).
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in this situation would demonstrate an even-handed approach to the
implementation of IRCA. The court's adoption of this two-pronged
remedy would also explicitly harmonize the NLRA with the INA in
terms of the new immigration amendments.
Qualifying Workers
Undocumented workers who have been in the United States prior
to January 1, 1982, or who have met the ninety-day agriculture re-

quirement,10 2 are eligible for legalization. These workers should be

treated as United States workers. If they are subject to a retaliatory

discharge, they should receive both the reinstatement and backpay
remedies, as should any employee under the NLRA.

The court's standard of review should be an absolute application

of NLRA remedies. The remedies should be conditioned only upon

these individuals not being disqualified by nonwaivable grounds of
exclusion

0

3

or upon their failure to pursue legalization. This stan-

dard would give individuals who have been legalized the same rights
and would meet both narrow and broad
as legally available workers
04
readings of Sure-Tan.1

Limbo or Grandfathered Workers
This category of workers represents the most vulnerable group of
undocumented persons. Their status is de facto lawful inasmuch as
IRCA refers to the grandfathering of these workers - that is, they
are not subject to the reporting requirements under employer sanc-

tions.10 5 However, should these workers be confronted by the INS,
they would be deported. IRCA has not conferred lawful immigration
status upon these workers.

102. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
103. Exclusions of waivers include criminal offenses, likely to become a public
charge, drug offenses (except for a minor charge of possession of marijuana), national
security reasons, membership in certain organizations, and those who assisted in Nazi
persecutions. Because undocumented workers often work at low-paying jobs, they may
qualify as public charges because they may be eligible for public assistance supplements.
To avoid this bizarre consequence, IRCA provides a special rule for determining whether
an individual is a public charge: "an alien is not ineligible for adjustment of status under
this section ... if the alien demonstrates a history of employment in the United States
evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assistance." IRCA § 201(a), 100
Stat. 3398 (amending/adding INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii)).
104. For example, a broad reading of Sure-Tan might find that no undocumented
workers are eligible for NLRA remedies, whether they are present in the United States
or not; a narrow reading of Sure-Tan would exclude only those undocumented workers
who no longer are present in the United States.
105. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

Reasonably, the remedies available to this class of workers should
be less than those available to qualifying workers, but more than
those available to post-enactment workers. However, there is no mid-

dle ground unless the number of remedies to qualifying workers are
increased. In the present analysis, grandfathered workers can be
analogized more closely to post-enactment workers and given only
the backpay remedy, or they can be analogized more closely to qualifying workers and given both the backpay and reinstatement
remedies.

Since IRCA has conferred a de facto lawful employment status
upon these grandfathered workers, the scales tip in favor of classifying them with qualifying workers for the purposes of applying the
NLRA. Should these workers be the subject of a retaliatory discharge, their immigration status should not come to the notice of the

INS. To do so through the NLRA process would defeat the
grandfathering effect of IRCA as well as the intent of Congress as
expressed in the committee report that employer sanctions not be
"used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law."' 10 6 Furthermore, refusal to grant both remedies to these
workers would create a chilling effect on the enforcement of the
NLRA, for no undocumented worker would wish to call attention to
his unlawful immigration status. It is precisely at this juncture that
the violation-of-rights theory is most compelling - that domestic
worker rights are undermined by the presence of a sub-class of workers who can be threatened by employers with impunity.
106. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Labor adjudicatory agencies, such
as the NLRB and the ALRB, should consider evidence regarding an employee's immigration status as irrelevant to the dispute determination process. Such evidence in a concerted action hearing merely undermines the central issue: the determination of whether
employee rights have been violated. The proposed model argues that the employer should
not be permitted to make use of the employee's immigration status during a labor dispute
hearing. Such a provision would be consistent with Congress' attempt to demagnetize the
employer's attraction to undocumented workers. In effect, once the employer hires a
worker, the employer should be estopped from using extraneous information to defeat an
action that arises between the employer and the employee. The only time at which IRCA
compels the employer to take notice of an employee's lawful immigration status is when
the employer is hiring a new worker. Outside of this context, the employer should not be
concerned with the employee's immigration status.
Once a finding is reached and a remedy is to be awarded, however, there must be some
determination of the employee's immigration status to decide which category of the proposed model applies: Is the worker to be treated as a post-enactment worker? As a
grandfathered worker in limbo? As a worker eligible for (or possessing) lawful immigration status? One approach that may lend itself to this inquiry is a procedure used in the
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) project, described in the Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68.
SAVE would provide the labor adjudicatory agency with INS data in order to sort all
workers eligible for remedies (or even a more limited group who attest to being noncitizens or nationals) into one of the three categories, but prohibits the INS from using
such inquiries for its own enforcement activities.
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Although the remedies for the grandfathered workers would be
the same as those for qualifying workers, the absence of a permanent
foothold in the legalization process sets the two classes of workers
apart. Congress could have obliterated the difference between these
two categories by making legalization available to all workers present in the United States at the date of enactment, but it did not
choose to do so. These workers are extended the umbrella of protections as employees under the NLRA, but they are not shielded from
the rational application of INA regulations.
Thus, a threshold question is presented. The courts must first determine how the grandfathered worker has been administratively noticed. If the individual has been noticed through the NLRA process,
deference should be given to NLRB regulations. In this instance, the
undocumented worker in limbo would be shielded from INS deportation proceedings and treated only in the context of an unfair labor
practice. However, if the individual has been noticed through some
independent method by the INS (excluding reports from the employer), deference should be given to INS regulations. In this instance, by contrast, the undocumented worker in limbo would not be
shielded from INS proceedings. The notice threshold reasonably allocates the rights 107and risks that characterize these undocumented
workers in limbo.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has proposed a model for deciding what remedies
should be afforded to IRCA's three classes of undocumented workers
in retaliatory discharge situations. The model is guided by the manner in which domestic workers can best be protected under the complementary operation of the NLRA and the INA. The model also
suggests modifications to the Sure-Tan and post-Sure-Tan holdings
in light of IRCA provisions, particularly employer sanctions and the
presence of a class of undocumented workers in limbo. The following
summarizes the proposed remedies for these three classes of workers:
107. An evidentiary problem arises if the employer does not directly report the
undocumented worker to the INS, as occurred in Sure-Tan, but does so surreptiously. In
order to deter employers from taking advantage of unlawful immigration status in a labor dispute, the courts could permit the trier of fact to form an inference, or alternatively, Congress could legislate the same outcome: during a concerted action, any report
to the INS concerning the employees' immigration status should be considered as the
employer's report, thereby triggering deference to the NLRB approach and excluding
any INS action. Whether the worker is engaged in a labor rights issue can be determined
objectively.

1) Post-enactment or Future Undocumented Workers. Undocumented workers who come to the United States after the enactment
of IRCA should not be given reinstatement as a remedy since it is
against the law for employers to knowingly hire undocumented persons after the law's enactment on November 6, 1986. However, these
workers should be given backpay as a remedy. The employer's temptation to use undocumented workers would be diminished by ensuring that no benefit accrues to hiring these workers in preference to
domestic workers. The chief deterrent mechanism in IRCA is employer, not employee sanctions. Thus, the courts should support the
mechanism chosen by Congress to deter undocumented employment,
namely, through the shaping of employer practices.
2) Qualifying Workers. Undocumented workers, who have been in
an illegal status prior to January 1, 1982, are eligible for legalization. Barring any exclusionary factors, and assuming they pursue legalization, these workers should be analogized to legally available
workers and provided with both reinstatement and backpay remedies
in any retaliatory discharge situation.
3) Limbo or Grandfathered Workers. The workers who are most
vulnerable to exploitation are undocumented workers in limbo. These
workers are not eligible for legalization, and yet have a de facto legal
status by being grandfathered out of employer reporting requirements under IRCA. Unless these workers choose to leave the United
States on their own initiative, deportation would occur only if they
are reported to the INS by the employer or if they come to the attention of the INS independent of employer reports. Employer reports to the INS have been singled out by the courts and by Congress as an abuse of the NLRA and as injurious to domestic worker
rights. Should undocumented workers in limbo come to the attention
of the court as a result of an employer's report while the workers are
asserting protected labor rights, the court should provide both reinstatement and backpay remedies. In this way, the significance of the
grandfather clause is preserved. However, should the undocumented
worker come to the attention of the court independent of an employer's report, and hence outside the purview of the NLRA, the
court should defer to INS procedures that affect all undocumented
workers. Congress did not extend legalization to these workers, only
toleration.
JOSEPH NALVEN

